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BasicCharacteristics of
Egyptian Agriculture
InPart Two we study the effects within agriculture of government interven-
tion in prices, production, and foreign trade. We have emphasized that in an
economy like that of contemporary Egypt it makes little sense to select the
controls at the border (tariffs and other trade taxes, import and export licens-
ing, foreign exchange restrictions, and so forth) for special study without con-
sidering the concurrent controls in the interior. The latter have usually been
designed with some regard to the former and vice versa, and each may be
intended to reinforce or neutralize particular effects from the other set of
controls.
Agriculture in Egypt is characterized by a number of special features that
critically influence the impact of government controls. Although descriptions
of Egyptian agriculture can be found in a number of publications,' this chapter
provides a brief summary, for the benefit of the general reader, of those of its
characteristics relevant to the problems under review. We also present some
new estimates of supply (area response) elasticities and a general description
of quantitative regulations directed specifically at agriculture.
OUTPUTS, INPUTS, AND VALUE ADDED
Table 6—1showsthe production account of agriculture for 1965. It is a gross
account; seeds and fodder are agricultural outputs the value of which is
included in field crops, and natural manure and eggs for hatcheries appear as
both output and input. On the other hand, the expenditure by public authori-






(mc!. fodder) 383.9 Seeds 20.7
Vegetables 45.5 Chemical fertilizers 40.6
Fruits, etc. 22.6 Natural fertilizers 36.2
Insecticides 4.6
Total plant Fodder 53.5
production 452.0 Eggs for hatcheries 1.6
Fuel 11.0
Dairy products 42.3 Maintenance and
Meat, etc. 41.7 depreciation 3.9
Poultry 24.1
Natural fertilizers 36.2 Total intermediary inputs 172.1
Fish and game 13.7
Total animal
production 158.0 Net value added 437.8
Total output 610.0 Total inputs (mci. profits) 610.0
SouRcE: "Estimates of National Income from the Agricultural Sector, 1965," Central
Agency for General Mobilization and Statistics (CAGMS), 1964 (in M. Clawson, H. H.
Landsberg, and L. T. Alexander, The Agricultural Potential of the Middle East, Elsevier,
New York, 1971, p.
ties for operating the irrigation and drainage system is not included among
the costs. Current government expenditure for indirect services to agriculture
and irrigation was estimated at £E4.4 and 4.6 million, respectively, or a
total of £E9 million in 1959_60.2 These "hidden" production costs amount
to about 7 percent of the value of produced intermediary inputs (including
feed and seed), or 2½ percent of value added at that time. They are difficult
to distribute by crop.
Table 6—2 presents detailed information for 1965 on area, production,
value ex farm, exports, and imports of major field crops (covering more than
90 percent of the total crop area). They are divided into summer, winter, and
autumn crops, and crops that are either perennial or can be grown at any time
of the year. This table also gives some impression of the substitution
possibilities.
Substitution between outputs often implies substitution between inputs,
since input requirements differ substantially between crops (at given prices).BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURE 139
Sugar cane and cotton are heavy fertilizer consumers, whereas beans, lentils,
and clover need relatively little fertilization. Cotton needs nitrates, beans and
clover need phosphates. Crops have also very different requirements for other
inputs: water, draught-power, labor, etcetera. Substitution between inputs for
a given crop is also possible, of course. It should be added that, although soil
quality and climatic conditions are unusually homogeneous in the Nile Valley
and the Delta, there are nevertheless significant differences between regions
with regard to soil characteristics, temperature, and water supply, and a
change in the acreage for a particular crop may by itself imply changes in the
input coefficients.
THE IRRIGATION SYSTEM
Apart from a narrow strip of poor land along the Mediterranean Sea where
barley, figs and a few other crops can be grown on rain-fed land, Egyptian
agricultureis based entirely on irrigation with water from the Nile. The
modern irrigation system in the Nile Valley and the Delta is dependent upon
the control of the river With the new Aswan High Dam (completed in
1971), the Nile's control has been brought to the absolute maximum as far as
Egypt is concerned.
Before the Aswan High Dam began modifying the water flow in 1965,
evening out the difference between water levels during the flood season and
the rest of the year, about one-sixth of the total cultivated area was still under
basin irrigation (the ancient method), with only one crop per year (mainly in
Upper Egypt). Now that the High Dam is completed, basin irrigation should
virtually disappear, and much more water is available during the first half of
the year. In 1963 the total cropped area (not including certain vegetables)
was 10.4 million feddan4 on a cultivated area of 6.1 million feddan,5 with the
number of crops per year thus averaging 1.7; on areas with perennial irrigation
two crops per year are typical.
Before the modern irrigation system was initiated a century ago, basin
irrigation predominated and Nile silt was the only fertilizer (aside from natural
manure). The silt was fertile, giving.very high yields for most crops. With
basin irrigation, the silt is deposited on the soil; with perennial irrigation, it
tends to settle in the canals. The introduction and expansion of perennial
irrigation and Continuous cropping and the predominance of cotton, in par-
ticular, made the application of chemical fertilizers a necessity.
The consumption of chemical fertilizers increased rapidly, and at the
beginning of the sixties Egypt had one of the highest nitrate fertilizer inputs
(measured by nutritional content per acre) among LDC's. With the completion












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.142PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURE
lake to the south of the dam and has almost completely disappeared from the
irrigation water; preservation of fertility has thus required a further increase
in the use of chemical fertilizers. In accordance plans, fertilizer input did,
in fact, increase substantially from 1960—61 to 1965—66 (nitrates, by 77 per-
cent, phosphates, by 82 percent), but fell somewhat thereafter, due partly to
the war in 1967 and partly to the foreign exchange shortages starting around
1965—66. Fertilizer input must have been suboptimal since 1966, and this
circumstance may have influenced crop yields negatively.
The basic problem in Egyptian irrigation has always been the provision
of an adequate water supply for the profitable summer crops, particularly
cotton, rice, and summer flood time lasts from the end of July to
October—November, and there is, practically speaking, always sufficient water
for autumn and winter crops (sown in August and November—December,
respectively). The supply during the first half of the year depends partly upon
the previous year's flood level and partly upon storage possibilities.
Before the closure of the river by the High Dam in 1965, rice cultivation
fluctuated sharply with the level of water supply in May and June. At a low
level of supply, the rice acreage would be low, and acreages of other crops,
especially corn, would be expanded instead. Rice may also be cultivated as
an autumn (flood) crop (sown in August), but the yield of autumn rice is
poor. Corn may be cultivated as a summer crop, when it yields much more
than in autumn. However, summer corn, too, is dependent upon an abundant
water supply. Hence, a low flood one year and a low water supply during the
following spring implied a decrease in the acreage of high-yielding summer
rice and an expansion of low-yielding autumn corn, with land fallow from
May to August. In modern times the effects on the rice and corn crops consti-
tuted the most important implication of variations in the water supply. Since
the erection of the High Dam, thanks to its large storage capacity, the water
flow can be kept almost constant. A substantial expansion of the rice area and
a substantial shift from low-yielding autumn corn to high-yielding summer
corn have been the most conspicuous agricultural gains from the High Dam.6
The irrigation system is largely controlled by the government, and its
technical characteristics seem to make a relatively centralized form of regula-
tion essential. In fact, the irrigation system—with respect to both investment
outlays and current operation—has always been a government
with the implication that the government cannot be neutral in regard to condi-
tions of cultivation.
Water is distributed free, and costs are partly paid from the
public budget. Advocates of market forces have recommended that irrigation
water be priced, but so far nobody has been able to design a system that
would work from a technical and administrative point of view. The introduc-
tion by the British of the uniform land tax, based on rental value, at theBASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURE 143
beginning of this century was partly motivated as a payment for water. At
present, however, the land tax, based on assessments of 1949 and perforated
by numerous exemptions, has little relation to water supply.
CROP ROTATION
With land under Continuous crop cultivation, crop rotation takes on paramount
importance. Egyptian peasants are well aware of this, and for ordinary field
crops they have traditionally applied rotation systems, with cotton grown
once every two or three years. Cotton tends to exhaust the soil as to nitrates,
and is therefore grown after berseem (Egyptian clover, the major animal
feed), which builds up the nitrate content of the soil; but even then, it is widely
believed, in the longer run cotton could probably not be grown every year.
Opinions have been strongly divided with respect to the long-run feasibility of
the two- and three-year system, but the prevailing (official) attitude favors the
three-year rotation.7 It has been argued by British cotton breeders, however,
that with adequate fertilization cotton could, indeed, be cultivated every year
without detrimental long-term effects on fertility. The economically optimal
rotation must, of course, also depend upon relative output and input prices,
and with improved technology, particularly improved fertilizing, a wider range
of rotations than those traditionally applied may become available. In practice
both two- and three-year rotations are applied by farmers.8'
Examples of modern rotations follow.
Two-Year System
Rotation
First year: Clover (from last year, one cut)—cotton—wheat.
Second year: Wheat (from last year)—rice (or, at low water supply, fal-




First year and second year: Same as above, except that beans would be
planted instead of clover at the end of the second year.
Third year: Beans (from last year)—rice (corn, millet)—clover (to next
year), etcetera.
The crop rotation problem has relevance for the present study in two
respects. First, substitution between crops is only possible if it is feasible to
change the rotation. If the technically feasible rotations are limited in number,
the possibilities of substitution among crops are limited as well. Moreover, it
takes time to shift from one rotation to another one.
Second, it may be argued that we should, in principle, consider rotations144 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURE
rather than particular crops when discussing protection, profitability, com-
petitiveness, etcetera. For a given rotation, the individual crops are joint
products. But if a large number of alternative (otations are feasible, substitu-
tion may be almost smooth.
The possibility of continuous cropping and the necessity of crop rotation
complicate the appraisal of Egyptian agriculture in regard to optimality be-
cause we find both competition and complementarity between crops. Summer
(autumn) and winter crops tend to be complementary simply because the
summer is too hot for certain crops and the winter too cool for others. Yet
summer and winter crops may overlap and thus compete for land (cotton
grows from February—March to October—November, wheat from November to
April, and corn, from July to December). Other crops are complementary
from a fertility point of view (cotton as against clover and pulses). Competi-
tive crops may not be equally competitive with respect to the basic inputs of
land, labor, and water. Two crops that compete for land may not compete
seriously for labor, not only because input coefficients differ but also because
input seasons differ. Cotton and corn are a good example: the growth periods
in the Delta are March to October—November for cotton and May to October,
or July—August to December, for corn (summer and autumn corn, respec-
tively); the inputs of land do overlap in time, whereas the inputs of labor do
not because most labor input takes the form of soil preparation and sowing at
the beginning of the growth period and of harvesting at the end. The seasonali-
ties and hence the competition for inputs form an intricate jigsaw puzzle and
play an important role in evaluating the relative profitability of crops and
rotations. Chart 6—i gives an impression of the crop seasons in Lower (Delta)
and Upper (Nile Valley) Egypt. (The graph dates back to 1914, but it is the
best we could find and the seasons have not changed significantly.) It should
not be overlooked, however, that the seasons are not absolutely rigid, although
they are geared to climate (mainly temperature) and irrigation cycles. Seeding
of cotton in the Delta may, for instance, be postponed until April, albeit with
detrimental results for yields, yet another substitution possibility to complicate
the picture even further.
The -rigidityof the crop rotation is difficult to ascertain, and opinions
seem to differ widely. If it were true, for example, that cotton cannot be grown
more often than every third year for purely technical reasons in the long run,
there would be an upper limit of at most one-third of the cultivated area at
which the long-run marginal costs of growing cotton become forbidding. At
this upper limit cotton export taxes, for instance, would have no direct influ-
ence upon resource allocation and would only affect income distribution. The
fact is, that the cotton acreage has never exceeded about one-third of the
total cultivated area. This could be due to lack of imagination and know-how,
insufficient availability of fertilizers, or persuasion and direct interference by146PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURE
the authorities, and does not necessarily mean that a three-year crop rotation
is a physical necessity. As mentioned before, however, both three- and two-
year rotations have, in fact, prevailed for crops bther than sugar cane, fruits,
and vegetables.
Rice cultivation requires an abundant water supply, and as noted above,
fluctuated strongly with the water supply in May and June prior to 1964.
Quite apart from the possibility that greater reliance could have been placed
upon pumping water to the rice fields in the northern part of the Delta, one
also wonders whether these fluctuations were a technical necessity or partly
resulted from the management of the irrigation system. The storage facilities
in the Delta give the authorities some flexibility in regulating the water supply
to the fields in May and June regardless of the concurrent discharge of the
Nile. Until the beginning of the sixties, the short-term management of the
system was subordinated to the water requirements of cotton, while rice was
treated as a residual crop. Before World War I, when the irrigation system
was originally designed, rice was generally a poor crop except in the salty
lands of the North, where it was relatively thc best crop. But the relative
profitability of rice has increased over time (both yield and price have im-
proved in relative terms), and the long-term investment policy for irrigation
has led to an uptrend in rice cultivation. The question with respect to earlier
performance is, however, whether it was necessary to let rice be the residual
on an annual basis. The answer is that rice probably could have been kept
more stable at the expense of cotton and corn. When the rice prices on the
world market began rising around 1960, a substantial crop expansion took
place that was not related to high flood levels but, rather, to the storage
facilities in the Delta.
We shall return to these problems in connection with individual crops.
At this point we only emphasize that the limitations on crop rotation in Egypt
may be less rigid than sometimes assumed, but that, at least until the beginning
of the sixties, the authorities may have tended to plan agricultural production
within too narrow a technical frame. The latter was, after all, largely outlined
by British hydrological and agronomical engineers at a time when the tech-
nology of irrigation was less developed than, and the relative profitability of
crops different from, today.
Finally, let us note that fruits and vegetables (except onions) are in most
cases cultivated in areas outside the standard rotations of field crops. Vege-
tables tend to be cultivated around the big cities, while fruit plantations can
be found everywhere except in the northern part of the Delta. Although the
natural conditions for growing vegetables and fruits and the proximity to the
European markets might make these crops very profitable under conditions of
free trade (in Egypt as well as in Europe), this study did not include them,
since price and cost data were missing or entirely inadequate. This is unfortu-BASIC CHARACTERISTICSOF EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURE 147
nate also because both crops have shown relatively fast growth during the
last twenty years and are more important than some of the crops we did in-
clude. The area of vegetable cultivation (not including onions) increased
from 252,000 feddan in 1952 to 495,000 feddari in 1961 and 706,000 in
1970, while the area planted with fruit trees increased from 94,000 feddart to
137,000 feddan and 232,000 feddan over the same period.
SUPPLY (ACREAGE) ELASTICITIES
FOR FIELD CROPS (1913-1961)
Appendix A reports on an attempt to estimate supply (or acreage) responses
with respect to profitability (price), total area, total labor, and total water
input for a number of field crops. The estimates were based on data for the
years 1913 to 1961, with due regard to area controls. The response functions
—of the Nerlove type—were set up primarily to help in the appraisal of the
cropping pattern after 1961 (see Chapter 7). As a by-product, the average
short- and long-term elasticities set out in Table 6—3 were obtained. It should
be emphasized that these are not partial but total elasticities. They were calcu-
lated on the (estimated) reduced forms of a complete general equilibrium
model for agriculture. Thus, the elasticities take into account all repercussions
on other crops and are constrained by actually existing total acreage, labor
force, and water supply.
Two features stand out as rather remarkable.
1. Generally, the short-term price elasticities are low—for the basic
food crops (corn, millet, wheat, onions, beans, and lentils) even close to
zero. There are four possible explanations for the very low short-term elastici-
ties: our elasticities are "total" with individual crop area responses constrained
by the total crop area; rigidities in the crop rotation—it takes time to shift
from one rotation to another even when alternative rotations are available;
rigid operation of the irrigation system; and the fact that some of the basic
food crops are essentially subsistence crops.
2. The long-term elasticities for all the big crops—cotton, rice, corn,
millet, and wheat—as well as onions and lentils are small, too, and close to
the short-term elasticities. Once more the fact that our elasticities are "total"
may be the explanation. Rotational rigidities, on the other hand, can hardly
explain low long-term elasticities, but the phenomenon adds to our suspicion
that the government's operation of the irrigation system has, indeed, always
tended to freeze cropping in a rather rigid pattern.
For cotton (lint and seed as joint products) the short- and the long-run
elasticities are 0.25 and 0.30, respectively, both highly significant. Nerlove1°
and, in particular, Krishna11 have obtained much higher elasticities for the148PROTECTION, CONTROLS, ANDCOMPETITIVENESSIN AGRICULTURE
TABLE 6-3
AverageElasticities of Crop Acreages




Short- Long- Total Crop Water
SeasonEstimate Term Term Area LaborSupply
Summer—Autumn
Cotton I.V.2 0.25a 0.30a 0.79 0.07 —0.17
Rice I.V.1 0.41b 0.49 0.30 0.61 1.39
Corn I.V.l —0.02 —0.02 1.59 —0.26 —0.04
Millet I.V.1 0.05 O.09b —1.16 0.77 0.32
Winter
Wheat I.V.2 0.03 0.04 0.33 0.36 —0.27
Onions L.S. 0.13 0.25b
0.25a 4:99a
6.01 —0.60 1.12
Barley I.V.2 —0.49 —2.15 —8.89
Beans I.V.1 0.17 0.67 0.91 —0.96 0.21
Lentils I.V.1 0.17 0.30 —0.02 0.29 0.14
Helba I.V.2 3.64" 7.94 —4.31 0.00
Perennial
Cane I.V.2 0.lla 0.81" 4.17 —1.12 0.29
NOTE: The elasticities presented here were obtained from the estimates chosen for
the area predictions in Chapter 7. The price elasticity is equal to the corresponding
F-value elasticity times one minus the crop's weight in F. The elasticities are based on
mean values of acreage and F for the period 1913—1961. The response functions do not
assume constant elasticities. L.S. denotes ordinary least squares estimate, LV. 1 and I.V.2
denote instrumental variable estimates, steps 1 and 2, respectively.
SOURCE: Appendix A.
a. t-value > 3: short-term, profitability variable; long-term, lagged area.
b. t-value > 2: short-term, profitability variable; long-term, lagged area.
United States and India, respectively. Using simpler functions, however, other
authors have also come out with relatively low elasticity values for the Egyp-
tian cotton area. Thus, for the period 1870—1913, Bresciani-Turroni found an
elasticity of 0.4; for the years 1915—1941, Nour El Din obtained an (average)
elasticity of 0.2; Stern, using all the years from 1913 to 1937, came up with
an elasticity of about 0.4; and, excluding twenty-four years with area restric-
tions between 1913 and 1959, one of the authors of this volume, unlike the
other three who disregarded area restrictions, estimated an elasticity of
only 0.09.12
Rice is the only major crop with a substantial short-term price elasticity,
0.41; its long-term elasticity is only slightly higher. It may cause surprise thatBASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURE 149
rice should have the highest short-term price elasticity among the crops studied
here. It is usually assumed that rice cultivation is largely determined by the
available water supply. Water is, indeed, an important determinant of the
rice acreage (see Table 6—3); both short- and long-term elasticities of rice
acreage with respect to water are high. The short-term price elasticity is based
on a coefficient for relative output value per feddan (F) that is significantly
different from zero only at the 95 percent level, and therefore it cannot be
excluded that the true price elasticity is much lower than 0.41. However, the
substantial short-term price elasticity may be due to the circumstance that
rice is partly grown in the northern part of the Delta, where salinity is sub-
stantial and thus, on the one hand, the standard rotations are less appro-
priate and, on the other, the extensive margin of cultivation is more flexible
than in the rest of the Delta and the Nile Valley. This, however, does not
explain why the long-term elasticity should only be slightly higher than the
short-term elasticity. The government's management of the irrigation system
may be responsible for both features (see below).
Corn, millet, and wheat have negligible price elasticities, both short- and
long-term. For corn the elasticities are even negative. For both corn and millet
the natural explanation is that these crops are subsistence crops, mainly grown
for the farmers' own consumption.'3 But for wheat this explanation is hardly
satisfactory. A substantial part of the wheat crop is sold in the market, and
before 1900 wheat was an important export crop.
Barley and helba (fenugreek) differ from the other crops in having
sizable short-term elasticities and high long-term elasticities.'4 For barley the
explanation is probably that this crop is mainly grown in the northern part.
of the Delta and along the coastal strip. It is thus partly grown outside the
standard rotations, where the extensive margin of cultivation is flexible. Helba
is mainly grown in the valley, but being a very small crop it has no important
place in the rotations and may for that reason be easily adjusted to changing
profitability.
Sugarcane hasa very low short-term, but quite a substantial long-term,
elasticity. This feature is easy to explain. Cane remains on the fields for up
to three years (and thus yields two or three crops), and it may take three
years until it is replaced by another crop. Moreover, the largest part of the
cane area is cultivated under contract with the (government-controlled) fac-
tories, which fix both prices and acreage. The remainder is produced for the
free market and sold to small private molasses factories. In the long term,
however, the sugar factories, too, have to pay enough to call forth the sup-
plies they want to buy—hence the relatively high long-term elasticity.
We note, finally, that the explicit inclusion of animal feed (clover) and
fruits and vegetables, which may themselves have higher elasticities (at least
in the long run) than field crops, might have increased elasticities somewhat150PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURE
for the field crops listed in Table 6—3. Independent observers believe that the
rapid increase of both vegetable and fruit acreages during the last two decades
is a response to rising relative prices, and that the same is true of the expan-
sion of the clover area during the sixties.
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
IN AGRICULTURE
Even apart from the inevitable government intervention in the management
of the irrigation system and in the problems of externalities related to plant
diseases, agricultural policies in Egypt have made much use of quantitative
regulation in regard to production, prices, and foreign trade. With foreign
trade almost completely nationalized since 1961 and run by government orga-
nizations, both prices and quantities supplied are open to direct government
intervention. And, although agriculture is almost exclusively based on small,
privately owned farms (since 1969, the maximum area is 50 feddan per owner
and cultivator), it is now organized in a way that permits centralized control
of both prices and cultivated areas, at least for major crops.
Production Restrictions.
Production restrictions were already in use at the end of the last century,
when cultivation of tobacco, a big and lucrative crop, was prohibited for
purely fiscal reasons (while imports could be taxed effectively, domestic pro-
duction evaded taxation on a large scale)Arealimitations were frequently
applied to cotton from World War I onward to enforce the allegedly optimal
three-year rotation, to prevent cash-hungry peasants from exhausting the soil
(see Appendix A, Table A—I), and also, allegedly, to take advantage of
Egypt's monopolistic position in the long staple market. It has been argued,
on the other hand, that it was Egypt's supply-limiting policy that was at
least partly responsible for the introduction of long staple production in the
Sudan, Peru, and some other countries. And when, in the thirties, synthetics
appeared as a serious competitor to long staple cotton, there was little basis
left for the optimum tariff argument with respect to Egyptian cotton.'6 The
increasing input of chemical fertilizers, at the same time, seems to have put
an end to the soil exhaustion argument.
Another factor was also to enter the picture. From ancient times to the
end of the nineteenth century Egypt had always been a wheat exporter. With
the growing population, the country found itself unable to satisfy the domestic
demand for wheat at the prevailing low prices without imports; therefore,BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURE 151
area restrictions for cotton were in force both during World War II and the
1953—1960 period, coupled with prescriptions for wheat acreage as an import
substitution device. (Cotton and wheat cultivation overlap in February, March,
and April, and wheat can be grown every year.) The restrictions on the cotton
area and the prescriptions for wheat were not much respected by the farmers
except, perhaps, during the first year or two: "The minimum area fixed by
law for wheat throughout 1955—1959 ... wasexactly the maximum fixed
for cotton, but in actual fact the wheat area—designed to be higher than or
at least equal to that of cotton—was 19 percent lower."7 Chart A—i in Ap-
pendix A shows all years with cotton area restrictions from 1913 to 1961;
only some of these indicate a clear impact of the restrictions. The area pre-
scriptions were abrogated in 1960, and the export taxes were by and large
formally abolished during 1959 and 1960 (as described in Chapter 2). Be-
ginning with 1962 they were reintroduced de facto through the price policies
of the Cotton Commission (see below). -
Whereassimple area prescriptions thus may have had only a minor im-
pact on actual cultivation during most of the fifties, other developments, not
unrelated to the land reforms of 1952, slowly created possibilities for exten-
sive government control over the production of major crops. In connection
with the redistribution of land, the Ministry of Agriculture instituted an in-
genious compulsory common crop rotation system for the new farmers on
reform estates. The system was originally invented by the British during the
interwar period and applied to the Gezira project in the bifurcation of the
White and Blue Nile in the Sudan, whence the Egyptians took over the idea.
It aims at combining the advantages of private ownership and small farmers'
initiative with some large-scale economies in irrigation, soil preparation, financ-
ing, and trading, and gives the individual farmers land in different parts of
the area under common rotation. The three-year rotation system (as usual,
favored by the ministry) would thus imply that farmers be given land in three
different places, each one under a different crop. In this way large areas can
be grown with the same crop, while the individual small farmer will experience
on his three plots of land the same rotation he would apply individually, and
always have a food crop for the family, a feed crop for the buffalo, and a cash
crop for his expenses. Soil preparation, including ploughing, and irrigation may
become more rational, taking advantage of large-scale economies in these pro-
cesses (even with traditional technology), and mechanization becomes pos-
sible, whereas seeding, weeding, fertilizing, and harvesting (so far) are left
to the individual owner. Seeds and fertilizers with other chemicals are pro-
vided by the cooperative of the particular area concerned, which thus controls
plant varieties and fertilizer input, extends credit in case of need,'8 and takes
care of marketing of major crops. All decisions are, in principle, taken by
the council of the cooperative, formally elected by democratic methods,152PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURE
whose chairman (usually an agronomist) however, is appointed by the minis-
try. It is believed that de facto itis the chairman, and thus ultimately the
ministry, who is the real decision maker, at least in matters of importance
for cultivation.'9
All observers seem to agree that the compulsory rotation system on the
land reform estates has been as conducive to productivity in Egypt as it had
been in the Sudan. While these estates constitute less than one-sixth of the
total cultivated area, the government, inspired by the success of the system,
started experimenting in the mid-fifties with cooperation along the same lines
outside the reform estates. In the opinion of the government these experiments
proved successful,2° too, and at the end of 1964 the system (still without re-
distribution or consolidation of ownership of holdings) was virtually extended
to the whole country. Each village is now organized into a cooperative where
membership is compulsory.
The intention of the government was to use the cooperative system for
controlling production of major crops. Detailed rules were laid down for culti-
vation of cotton and some other crops (beans and barley), prescribing the
varieties that should be grown in the individual regions of the country and
the amounts of seeds and fertilizers to be used per feddan.
The Ministry of Agriculture estimates the total area allotted to all major
crops. In this sense, the country has had an annual plan for crop acreages
since 1960. The plans were released by the Ministry of Planning for the (bud-
get) years 1960—61 to 1964—65 and 1966—67. For 1965—66 and all budget
years after 1966—67, the acreage plans do not seem to have been released.
Until 1963—64, however, these plans were (except for rice) little more than
passive forecasts of the farmers' expected behavior. It was not until the agri-
cultural year November 1964—October 1965 that the government possessed
the administrative machinery—the cooperative system—to impose its acre-
age plans upon the farmers.
Apparently the government has used this system mainly for controlling
the total cotton acreage and its distribution by staple length.21 The acreages
for most other crops, except rice, wheat, and sugar cane seem to reflect the
choice of the farmers, given the adjustments they have to make to fulfil the
cotton acreage requirements. Rice, of course, has continued to be influenced
by the government's management of the irrigation system, and the cultivation
of sugar cane has been tightly controlled. Apart from these crops it is difficult
to assess the impact of government control through the cooperative system.22
Wholesale Trade and Prices.
Wholesale trade in cotton is carried on by a special Cotton Organization;
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to domestic industry. Wholesale trade in cereals, sugar, and some other food-
stuffs is in the hands of the Ministry of Supply, which also takes care of imports
of food and its distribution to retail trade. Domestic trade in vegetables, onions,
fruits, poultry, and the like is mainly handled by private business, although a
network of government retail stores (so-called cooperative stores) has been
established. Also, there are free markets where surplus quantities of grain can
be sold by the farmers. The supply of manufactured inputs—mainly fertilizers,
pesticides, and fuel—is entirely in the hands of government organizations.
Since World War II the government has fixed prices for its purchases
from producers or has established support prices for major crops. Until 1964
such prices were fixed mostly to stabilize both farm income and the domestic
cost of living, and their level was chosen to strike a desirable balance between
rural and urban income; allocational considerations seem to have played a
secondary role. It is not clear how these policies, over all, have affected rural-
urban income distribution, but until 1964 they certainly helped to stabilize
domestic prices and may have had consequences for allocation of resources
in agriculture. With control over both price and supply, the possibility cannot
be excluded that, for any particular commodity, the country may be off the
demand, as well as the supply, curve. During the second half of the sixties,
in addition to area prescriptions, compulsory sales (in various proportions) of
certain food crops (rice, wheat, onions, ground nuts, beans, and lentils) at low
official prices to village cooperatives were introduced, with the possibility of
selling surplus output at higher prices in the free market. Actual deliveries,
however, tended more and more to fall short of requirements, and the system
was changed in
In recent years produciion at predetermined prices has been introduced
for cane, rice, onions, tomatoes, and other crops. Contracts are concluded
before sowing and stipulate delivery of specified quantities, at defined stan-
dards and specified prices.24 This is a particularly important innovation from
our point of view because it tends to break the lag between prices and produc-
tion (see below). This system is not compulsory and its extent is not known
to the authors.
It will be understood that the determinants of producer prices for outputs
differed considerably from crop to crop during the sixties. At one extreme
are crops like cotton (lint as well as seeds), which the authorities purchase
in their totality at prices fixed by the government itself. Sugar cane, cultivated
under contract with the factories, belongs to this category. At the other ex-
treme we have crops with free price formation; clover (berseem) and other
feed crops (not included in our estimates) are by far the most important items
in this group. Between these extremes we find most of the other field crops,
cereals and pulses, with producer prices influenced by both the government
and domestic market forces. When the Ministry of Supply purchases cereals154PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURE
and pulses it is always at prices fixed by the government. For some cereals
(rice and wheat) and pulses there was compulsory delivery of certain propor-
tions of the crops at very low prices until 1969. Other deliveries to the govern-
ment are voluntary, and farmers (usually via the cooperatives) have the
option of selling directly to private wholesale or retail dealers. For some crops
there are organized markets in Cairo and Alexandria. Price formation in these
markets, however, is constrained within rather narrow limits by government
prices for purchases from producers, on the one hand, and on the other, by
the maximum retail prices for products based on these crops (bread, flour) or
for the crops themselves (pulses, for instance). The latter prices are often low
and subsidized to the extent retail trade is based on government supply.
Rents.
An unusual feature, finally, is maximum rent for agricultural land, intro-
duced in 1952 and kept unchanged since then. Tenancy is important: in 1960
about half the area was cultivated by tenants. Short-term tenancy was abol-
ished in 1952, and it has become increasingly difficult for owners to evict
tenants. Rents predominate, although some share-cropping takes place.25 The
maximum rents, based on land tax assessments made in 1949, should cor-
respond in principle to market rents in that year.26 Market rents in 1952—53
may also have been below that level due to the collapse of the Korean boom.-
But since then agricultural output has more than doubled in value, and the
maximum rents are entirely out of line with hypothetical market rents.
Wages.
There are also statutory minimum wages for rural labor, but they have
never been enforced except in public works. By the mid-sixties, rural wages
reached the statutory level, but that was the result of a strong demand for
such labor and quite unrelated to the existence of statutory wages.
Shortages and Black Markets.
It might be expected that an economy with both price and quantity
controls would have extensive black markets. This has increasingly been the
case since the second half of the fifties for certain manufactured products as
well as for housing, but only to a minor extent for food and other agricultural
products. The government has geared its food import and export policies to
the domestic demand-supply situation; imports and exports have tended to be
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goods(tea, sugar, vegetable oils, kerosene), with free sales permitted at
high prices.
Shortages of food have nevertheless occasionally occurred: rice, fat, and
meat are examples. Such shortages have usually arisen in connection with
unexpected import difficulties or crash export programs (related, for instance,
to repayment of Russian loans), and black markets in food have emerged on
such occasions. Black markets are in most cases imperfect, however, and it is
in the nature of things that reliable black market price data are hard to obtain.
Black market rents for land (and housing) played a minor role in the fifties,
but are now the rule rather than the exception. They are often paid for the
right to obtain (or cancel) a rental contract in the form of a "bon de sortie,"
which represents the capitalized value of the difference between the hypotheti-
cal market rent and the prescribed maximum rent and is difficult to translate
into an annual rental. Moreover, systematic information is not available.
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